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2017.09.10 Sunday

Karma; Another reason to unveil the cover up of Fukushima Unit 4 because I am proud of having worked for Du Pont

I am the only person who fathomed the existence of weapon-grade plutonium in Unit 4 and its radiation release to the atmosphere on March 15, 2011.

It was July 20, 2014 when I first speculated it based on my deductive inference.

My motive then was simply to unveil the real magnitude of radiation contamination and strategy behind the cover up to solve the lingering anxiety among people coming from Fukushima radiation nightmare in order to rebuild not only radiation contaminated area but also my beloved country so utterly corrupt.

I didn't know that Du Pont made its commercial production facility at Hanford, Washington at the strong request of the US government. While I was there, nobody had never talked about it.


Mr. Walter S. Carpenter, Jr., President,                            August 11, 1945 

E. I. DuPont de Nemours Company,

Wilmington, Delaware.

Dear Mr. Carpenter:
At the last regular meeting of the Pasco Kiwanis Club a resolution was passed which reads as follows:
"An article in a local newspaper states that the DuPont Company received only One Dollar profit from the operations at the Hanford plant and that an expense item of thirty-two cents was not allowed by an accountant, leaving a balance of sixty-eight cents. Thirty-two members of this club are contributing one cent each to make up the difference and also placing their signatures to this letter."
We are very proud to be so closely situated to the Hanford project, and all of us feel very sincerely that we have had a part in this magnificent enterprise. We also hope that the Lord will see fit to direct the future efforts and achievements of this product into the right channel for the good of all mankind. (signed by Mel Swanson, president of the club together with 32 others). 


In contrast, plutonium can be produced by placing purified metallic uranium in a graphite reactor and bombarding it with low-energy neutrons generated by the uranium’s natural radioactivity and the reactor’s design. The neutrons interact with the uranium, causing some of its atoms to fission, or split, into lighter-weight elements, giving off tremendous amounts of energy but also two and sometimes three neutrons per fission.

Under the right conditions of geometry and the presence of uranium and a moderator (graphite in the Hanford reactors), one can achieve a controlled chain reaction and create atoms of plutonium inside the uranium fuel.

The task is then to separate the small amount of plutonium (about one part in 4000) from the highly radioactive irradiated uranium fuel and purify it to produce the raw material for an atomic bomb.

In summary, the production of plutonium avoided the need of isotope separation but involved the production and separation of an entirely new element. Neither of these steps had ever been done outside of the laboratory and plutonium had heretofore existed only in microgram amounts with little-known chemical properties and hazards




General Groves was a construction expert and he set about assessing which large U.S. construction firms had the capabilities needed to design and oversee construction of the large and complex facilities. His assessments continued during the autumn of 1942. For each of the two U 235 isotope separation processes, he contracted with groups of firms to undertake the design, construction and operation of each of the two different approaches.

For plutonium production, the OSRD had set up a government research organization, the Metallurgical Laboratory, to carry on the prerequisite research into all phases of the task of the formation and separation of this totally new material. But it was Groves' assessment that the task of taking that information generated by the Metallurgical Lab and designing, building, and operating a production facility could only be done through a turnkey contract with the DuPont Company. 

The corporate characteristics that led to that assessment included DuPont’s practice of designing and building their own plants (i.e. with their own engineering department), their reputation for rapid insertion of new plants into the market, their heavy emphasis on corporate research in determining their product line, and the corporate safety culture, fostered by their depth of experience in producing explosives and munitions.




On October 30, 1942, Willis Harrington, vice president at DuPont and a member of the company’s Executive Committee, received a telephone call from General Groves asking him to come to see him “to discuss a matter of great military importance to the United States.” The day after this telephone call, Harrington and Charles Stine, another vice president of DuPont, went to Washington to meet with Groves and Conant.

The DuPont executives received a detailed briefing about the project, the status of the work by the Metallurgical Lab, the uncertainties involved, and the role envisioned for DuPont. Harrington and Stine responded that they would report on the matter to DuPont’s Executive Committee.

DuPont’s Board of Directors was hesitant to take on the project partly because it was such a huge commitment, but also because of the potential for a repeat of the difficulties the corporation had following WWI; it was accused of making huge profits from munitions and branded “merchants of death”.

DuPont requested, and got, a letter from President Roosevelt requesting them to take on the project. The company refused any profits and agreed to sign the contract only on the condition that the company would be reimbursed for its expenses and receive one symbolic dollar.







General Leslie R. Groves, who was appointed Director of the Manhattan Engineer District in 1942, was convinced that DuPont could apply the same ingenuity to the plutonium production process needed for the development of an atomic bomb.

In September, Groves met with DuPont’s Executive Committee to convince them to undertake the construction and operation of the pilot plutonium separation plant to be built in Tennessee.


DuPont’s directors were wary. “We were asked to take on a job about equivalent to perpetual motion,” admitted DuPont President Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. “Recovering the power of the atom just seemed to be one of those things beyond all conceivable reach.”


Other concerns loomed large. DuPont did not want to be branded as “war profiteers” as they had been after World War I for supplying the Allies with gunpowder for handsome profits. “We had been severely criticized on the basis that we endeavored to incite the war in order to ignite profit by the manufacturer of materials,” recalled Carpenter. “The whole claim was without substance at all, but nevertheless that didn't mean that we wouldn't be subject to it again.”


There was also the very real possibility that the project would not succeed. “There was no assurance that any of these elements would operate,” admitted Crawford Greenewalt, then a chemical engineer for DuPont. “There was no assurance that you could make a reactor run at the high power levels that were required to produce plutonium. There was no assurance that the plutonium, if produced, could be separated. There certainly was no assurance at that time that an atomic bomb could be made, even given the plutonium.”


And then there were safety concerns.

“The losses conceivable in connection with this thing were just appalling—cataclysmic,” conceded Carpenter. “No one was quite sure that this might not get out of hand. And, if it did, it might devastate that entire area.”


By November 1942, DuPont was still reluctant to take on the massive project. In a last ditch effort, General Groves appealed to patriotism. He told the company that the atomic bomb project was essential to the defense of the United States and that a successful effort could affect the outcome of the war. “Groves laid it on the table, and he insisted that it was a matter that the President and the President's advisors wished to go ahead with…it was for us to come through and do our part,” recalled Carpenter.

“With that assurance from the President,” declared Greenewalt, “it became a question of patriotic duty to do it, so we did.”

This time, DuPont insisted that its fee for the project would only be one dollar.


Manhattan Project Spotlight: E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company Tuesday, September 30, 2014



プルトニウムを実験室で製造した米国金属研究所の「こうやってできなければ、別の方法をやればいい」との助言を退け、当時産業界の30年先をいくクリティカル・パス・メソッド(Critical Path Method)を駆使して後戻りせず要求された期限に間に合わせるプロジェクト設計と運営を行い、悲しいことだが長崎に間に合わせたのだ。








2017.09.08 Friday

Russian views of Japanese history

Japan in bubble period;


By the 1980s, Japan’s “economic miracle” caused a surge of interest in Japanese history, culture, and art, contributing to far more favorable treatment of Japan in public consciousness than the United States, and further, many European countries with much greater cultural similarity to Russia. Yet, rapid economic growth in Japan was perceived mostly as a temporary phenomenon caused by some Japan-specific factors, including a skilled and cheap labor force, advanced American technology, and low prices for commodity goods and energy resources. A stereotype was formed of the “hard-working Japanese people” skillfully applying and perfecting foreign technologies.

Such skepticism can be explained by Russia’s persistent West-centrism, according to which only Europe, and later the United States, was regarded as a source of cultural and especially technological progress. The term “Asian” was deeply stereotyped as a synonym of underdevelopment. Northern territory; After the end of the Cold War, the Russian political establishment inherited earlier stereotypes of Japan. The overwhelming majority of Russians, even those with basic historical education in the post-Soviet period, adopted the ¥Cold War postulates regarding Japan and Russo/Soviet-Japanese relations: the Soviet entry in the war against Japan was an act of ultimate historical justice leading to a speedy end of the war; Japan, as a defeated country, should bear its status with humility; the results of WWII, including the territorial acquisitions, are inviolable.

In the eyes of most Russians, Japan was still a subordinate country with “semi-colonial status” and, at best, did have practice its own foreign policy, or, at worst, served as a satellite of the United States—hence, a geopolitical adversary of Russia. Russia’s unfriendly attitude toward Japan aggravated since the mid-2000s, and climaxed in 2009-2010, when Japan accused Russia of the “illegal occupation” of the “Northern Territories” and sharply criticized the visit of President Medvedev and other high-ranked Russian officials. Russia defended its position that Japan is unwilling to acknowledge the results of WWII.


Abe's approach to Putin;


Russian public opinion on Japan was increasingly wary before Prime Minister Abe’s 2013 overtures to President Putin. In the minds of the Russians, Japan was immediately associated with extreme distaste with the unlawful claims to the Southern Kuril Islands. Against this background, even people insistent about the necessity to settle the territorial spat with Japan are, at best, treated by many as “not patriotic,” and at worst, as “traitors,” “selling national territory.”

Over the past three years, despite Abe’s continued pursuit of Putin, these attitudes have been remarkably resistant to change, in part because no positive narrative of the future Russo-Japanese partnership or Japan’s place in Asia has been presented to Russians.




Conservatives rest their argument on Russia’s status as a guarantor state of the Yalta-Potsdam system and postulate the inviolability of the results of WWII. Japan should adhere to their status of defeat, accepting it in repentance and humility. The Abe Cabinet’s national security policy aimed at revision of the Constitution and an active military build-up is viewed with alarm as “revenge-seeking.” Conservatives treat Japan’s territorial claims with extreme negative emotions.

Paradoxically, however, they are generally positive about the Japan-US military alliance, believing it to be the only effective tool that limits Japan’s military ambitions and need to acquire nuclear weapons, becoming a source of threat for Russia. The most radical proponents of this view insist that there even remains the possibility of a military attack by Japan in order to force a solution to the territorial problem.




Realists reject the dogmatic understanding of the WWII outcome and other historical issues inherent to conservatives, and instead, realistically assess the post-bipolar world realities, concluding that for today’s Russia, it is better to treat Japan not as a political adversary or a defeated enemy, but as a potential ally against China’s rapid military build-up, which will pose a much greater challenge to Russia. They see the present situation in bilateral relations as abnormal. A representative document is the review of the Russian Council of International Relations devoted to the present state of Russo-Japanese relations, written by a group of Russian experts on Japan headed by Ambassador Alexander Panov. It stresses that relations “suffer from the lack of momentum in their development” and laments that “neither Moscow nor Tokyo has its own strategic vision of the prospects for achieving a qualitatively new level of interaction and cooperation in line with new realities both in Asia-Pacific region and in the world.”

Realists attach particular importance to differences in the national interests of Japan and the United States, pointing to the “China threat” and Japan’s need to build good relations with Russia in order to neutralize this threat. To support this idea, they interpret contacts between the United States and China in conspiratorial terms, as an attempt to “divide the globe behind Japan’s back.” This type of thinking can be found among political analysts and diplomats with a more constrained outlook on the present situation than the conservatives.

It should be noted that after the Ukrainian crisis, with a growing anti-American component in Russian foreign policy, many Russian decision-makers tend to think that Japan supports the anti-Russian sanctions against her will, only out of solidarity with the West and under pressure from Washington. The opinion that Japan may contribute to Moscow’s overcoming its isolation, frequently heard in various informal settings, reflects the foreign policy thinking of the realist wing. Their historical thinking is not centered on resentment but how balances of power have come and gone, although they may cite past examples of Japanese resentment toward the United States.




The mercantilist faction insists on decisively distancing Russia from all complicating and conflict-generating issues of the past and relying on the mutuality of interests, primarily in the economic sphere. They accentuate the commonality of economic interests between Russia and Japan, based on the ability of Russia to supply Japan with energy, food, and transit opportunities in Europe in exchange for Japanese investment and technology.

This is the most radical “pro-Japanese” view, underscoring the inadmissibility of unilateral reliance on China, which carries for Russia the risk of becoming her “northern province.” Mercantilists believe that Russia and Japan should build their relations from scratch, not recalling their past grudges. Russia desperately needs Japanese investment and technologies, especially in Siberia and the Far East; in exchange, Russia should resolve the territorial dispute with Japan, or at least find the most conflict-free formula of freezing it.

As underlined by Trenin and Weber, “the existence of a ‘second Germany’ on the Pacific, in their opinion, will significantly strengthen the position of Russia on the world stage.” This thinking is widespread in the Russian expert community, economic bureaucracy, business community, and the liberal political wing, although they have not gained traction in today’s Russian society and are barely reflected in diplomatic policymaking. However, along with the growing crisis in the Russian economy and the emergence of serious problems in relations with China, one can expect strengthening of the mercantilists’ position in the decision-making sphere. For that to happen, there would need to be a downgrading of historical invocations.



Russia refrains from any moves that could potentially deteriorate political relations with Japan.

Moscow takes a very cautious approach to Tokyo’s present military policy and, unlike China, abstains from overly criticizing Japan—for example, for the 2015 National Security Act, which legalized Japan’s right to collective self-defense, and Japan’s attempts to change the Constitution.

Russia is also quiet about Tokyo’s relations with its neighbors, including the Yasukuni Shrine visits, history textbooks, “comfort women,” and in particular, territorial spats, where Moscow deliberately accentuates its neutrality.

Russia fears spoiling the already strained relations with Tokyo, as it tries to ensure their relations do not suffer additional challenges, and keep the door open for normalization of political relations with Tokyo.




In any agreement, all issues of WWII, including reparations and POWs, would be considered completely settled. The peace treaty is, in fact, no more than a euphemistic wording for a deal on the “territorial problem”—the main contested item to be settled. However, contrary to Japan, Russia is uneasy about using the phrase “territorial problem,” preferring to speak of “border demarcation” that should be resolved within the framework of the peace treaty. It is highly unlikely that Russia will go beyond the conditions of the Declaration of 1956. Given Japan’s insistence on settling the border issue, Russia would agree to its pursuit of a peace treaty in return for normalization of relations, but not to its conditions for settling the border issue, which may seriously undermine its own historical narrative.


August 29,2016 Special Forum

Russian views of Japanese history

Dmitry Streltsov

2017.04.02 Sunday

Potential backfire against Obama; Michael Flynn's testimony

The former US National Security Adviser Michael Flynn is now considered to be the one who has a decisive impact on Obama's coup against Trump administration. This is the political fierce war between the established neocon symbolized by Kagan and Nuland for democratic interventionism and new and more business oriented neocon primarily to represent the fossile fuel energy industry.

The war centers on alleged Trump's connection with Russia which is taken as the most formidable adversary of the US in their perspective of democratic interventionists including Hillary Rodham Clinton, John McCain and Lindsey Graham. 

TASS reports how Russia takes this political turmoil in the US including the possible congressional testimony of Michael Flynn as saying;  "The intention by former US National Security Adviser Michael Flynn to testify before federal and congressional investigators in a probe into US President Donald Trump’s alleged contacts with Russia has caused no Kremlin response, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday".



Michael Flynn's Russian connection is summarized by TASS quoting the past articles of Wall Street Journal:  


"The Wall Street Journal reported in March that before his appointment as Trump’s national security adviser, Flynn had interacted with some Russian companies, receiving a total of over $50,000 from them. The newspaper also asserted in its article that in December 2015 the Russian international news TV Channel RT had allegedly paid Flynn about $34,000 for his participation in a conference organized by RT. As the newspaper reported, Flynn spoke at the conference on the US foreign policy and intelligence issues.

According to the newspaper, the contacts between Flynn and Russian companies were held in the summer and in the autumn of 2015, i.e. after he quit the post of the Defense Intelligence Agency director a year earlier. However, Flynn still had access at the time to top secret information, the newspaper’s article said."

Flynn’s readiness to testify on Russia contacts evokes no Kremlin response」(March 31,2017)


These allegations remind me of David Plouffe, the campaign manager and close ally of Obama administration. There were at least two well known facts which are substantially the same as Michael Flynn's cases.    

Case 1: Azerbaijan

President Barack Obama's former campaign manager intends to give away the fee he received from a paid private speech he made Monday in the oil-rich but authoritarian nation of Azerbaijan.


The speech was arranged by lobbyists working with a group that has ties to the Azerbaijan government, according to people familiar with the matter. But a close associate of David Plouffe said he only learned of their involvement after he had already embarked for the Caspian Sea nation.


Mr. Plouffe now intends to donate his speaking fee, which the associate said is in the range of $50,000, to groups that advocate democratization in the turbulent post-Soviet states of the region around the Caspian and Caucasus mountain range. Mr. Plouffe also plans to share the contents of the speech with opposition groups.


U.S. officials said Mr. Plouffe coordinated his talks with American officials in the region and that his message about the uses of the Internet for democratic organizing advances longstanding U.S. policy. But they added that the Azerbaijan government has long sought to legitimize itself by hosting prominent Americans, often with the help of Washington lobbyists.

Plouffe to Donate Speaking Fee to Pro-Democracy Groups」(By GLENN R. SIMPSON Updated Feb. 10, 2009)


Case 2: Iran


David Plouffe, a senior White House adviser who was President Obama’s 2008 campaign manager, accepted a $100,000 speaking fee in 2010 from an affiliate of a company doing business with Iran’s government.


A subsidiary of MTN Group, a South Africa-based telecommunications company, paid Plouffe for two speeches he made in Nigeria in December 2010, about a month before he joined the White House staff.


Since Plouffe’s speeches, MTN Group has come under intensified scrutiny from U.S. authorities because of its activities in Iran and Syria, which are under international sanctions intended to limit the countries’ access to sensitive technology. At the time of Plouffe’s speeches, MTN had been in a widely reported partnership for five years with a state-

owned Iranian telecommunications firm.


There were no legal or ethical restrictions on Plouffe being paid to speak to the MTN subsidiary as a private citizen. But for a close Obama aide to have accepted payment from a company involved in Iran could prove troublesome for the president as the White House toughens its stance toward the Islamic republic. In recent weeks, Republican presidential contender Mitt Romney has accused the administration of being soft on Iran.

Obama associate got $100,000 fee from affiliate of firm doing business with Iran」(August 5, 2012)


2016.10.31 Monday

2020 Tokyo Olympic Games has to be boycotted

However, two immediate questions arise from the IAEA Report; 
1) It is ovbious that there was radiation release from SFP of Unit 4 due to the high water temperature even if there were water. Why is the core inventory information of Unit 4 not available in the Report?
2) If there were no radiation release from SFP, what was the source of extremely high radiation level inside Unit 4? 
These two questions are derived from contradictions anyone can find in the Report. 
There must be some reasons to hide the radiation release from Unit 4, either to trivialize the Fukushima radiation disaster or not to disclose something incovenient for IAEA and Japanese government.   
Until when a thorough answer to these questions is provided by the authorities, Tokyo should not host the 2020 Olympic games and I hope this analysis could be used to make "the protest at Japanese Embassy in Paris" more effective.   




I agree with their claim that ongoing nuclear catastrophe at Tepco’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, a catastrophe yet neither under control nor resolved,  the 2020 Olympics should be relocated somewhere else.

This particular blog provides two solid reasons why Tokyo should not host the 2010 Olympic games.  





1. Radiation rellease form Unit 4 is catastrophically larger 


Both IAEA and Japanese government say that there was no radiation release from spent fuel pool(SFP) of Reactor building(RB) Unit 4 but IAEA Report published in August, 2015 shows the serious contadiction to deny their insistence. 

The image is linked to the full report.

IAEA's self denial is in this page.

The same thing happened in Chernobyl where the more sophisicated counter to measure higher dose level was buried and broken in the rubble and they came to know later that the actual radiation level was 500 times the upper limit of 1000 mSv/hour. We don't know how bad the radiation level was inside Unit 4 but it is ovbious the radition was released into the air from the structural damage of the Unit 4 RB. 
The image is linked to the YouTube Video taken using drone after the explosion at Unit 4.  

Another contradiction of IAEA report is about the water temperature of SFP of Unit 4. 
Take a look at the right hand column of this chart and you can find the tenperature before the Earth Quake was 27℃ and it went to 84℃ on March 14, three days after the Quake and one day before the explosion of Unit 4 of March 15.  
There was neither water cooling due to power failure nor water injection during March 16 and March 19.

Even if there was sufficient water in SFP as IAEA insists, it is most likely that the temperature exceeded the boiling point of 100℃ in the next two ro three days due to the decay heat.
Again, there was no power to cool the water until March 26 and no water injection until March 20. There was no statement on temeperature measurement during March 15 and March 29 in the Report. 
I don't discuss the official notification of IAEA below of March 15, 2011 because the 2015 IAEA Report says that there was no radiation release from SFP of Unit 4 but the Report admits by itself there was high level radiation inside Unit 4 and the tempearture records of SFP of Unit 4 and cooling inability strongly indicates that there was radiation release from the SFP of Unit 4. 

This is the description of IAEA Report about Unit 4;
"Unit 4 had been shut down for the planned refuelling outage since 30 November 2010. The reactor was disassembled, with the head removed at the time of the earthquake. The cavity gates were installed, isolating the SFP from the upper refuelling pools. All fuel assemblies had been transferred from the core to the SFP. In total, 1331 spent fuel assemblies and 204 new fuel assemblies were stored inside the SFP, having an estimated decay heat of 2.26 MW by 11 March. The SFP temperature was 27°C at the time of the earthquake. "
If there were radiation release from Unit 4, the total picture of Fukushima radiation problem will be significantly differnt from what both IAEA and Japanese government are saying.  
2. The possibility of weapon grade plutonium release makes the disaster much worse
Although the IAEA Report underastimates the significance radiation contamination of plutonium, there was an early study published in Nature in 2012 which indicates massive weapon grade plutonium contamination.
Image is linked to the original paper.
(Weapon grade plutonium contains more than 93% of 239Pu which decays via unstable 238Pu to 241Pu which has 14 years of half life and then to 241Am of 433 years of half life.)  

This research implies that plutonum fall out from Fukushima is 100 times Nagasaki and 10 times the global fall out and the peak will come in 2042.

However, the same authors published another environmental study in 2013 and they made an assertion that there was no plutonium radiation release from SFP of Unit 4 and said that the investigation of 241Pu was not considered. 





Their assertion of no radiation release from SFP of Unit 4 and no consideration of 241Pu investigation are in acordance with the statement of page 135 of 2015 IAEA Report as shown below.



Thus, almost all environmental studies after Fukushima disaster are based on the atom ratio of core inventory of Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 3, from which the release of 239+240Pu and 241Pu is alledged much lower than Chernobyl.
In summary,
1. IAEA Report suggests that there was high level of radiation inside Unit 4 but there is no statement about what kind of nucleids are involved.
2. IAEA Report concludes that the release of plutonium is very limited based on core inventroy of Unit 1, 2 and 3.
3. IAEA Report implies that there was water in SFP of Unit 4 and Jian Zheng et al asserts there was no plutoium
release from SFP of Unit 4.
However, two immediate questions arise from the IAEA Report; 
1) It is ovbious that there was radiation release from SFP of Unit 4 due to the high water temperature even if there were water. Why is the core inventory information of Unit 4 not available in the Report?
2) If there were no radiation release from SFP, what was the source of extremely high radiation level inside Unit 4? 
These two questions are derived from contradictions anyone can find in the Report. 
There must be some reasons to hide the radiation release from Unit 4, either to trivialize the Fukushima radiation disaster or not to disclose something incovenient for IAEA and Japanese government.   
Until when a thorough answer to these questions is provided by the authorities, Tokyo should not host the 2020 Olympic games and I hope this analysis could be used to make "the protest at Japanese Embassy in Paris" more effective.
There is another leverage to be able use;

(The image above is linked to the full statement of SRS watch)
The US lent Japan 331Kg of weapon grade plutonium some 50 years ago for research purposes and Mr. Obama asked Japan for its return in January, 2014. 
A ship carrying 331kg left the port in Ibaraki Prefecture in Japan for the US in March, 2016.
続きを読む >>
2016.09.09 Friday

Don't worry! :No one read this because you blocked browsers again on Sep 2nd

I have no connection with NGOs what so ever and I didn’t ask anyone because this is quite sensitive issue. I am sure that you would understand my interest if you take a look at attached but let me explain briefly before reading slides.


I am a strategy architect for innovation projects and in order to avoid surprise after invenstment any strategy architect trys to make an inference what strategy his compeitor would take.

I have been teaching how to make inference real time through blog for more than eight years to my blog readers.


On July 20, 2014 I wrote a blog after two month hesitation that 331Kg of Plutonium was somehow in Unit 4 of Fuksima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and melted down.

It was May this year that I found the title and URL of this particular blog was not hit by Google search and three major browsers , Internaet Explorer, chrome and Firefox were blocked for my blog. I was confident with the conclusion of my deductive inference but I actually could do nothing because I have no solid evidence. Then, a friend of mine living in the US informed me of your statement.


I don’t know whether 238Kg ( 331-93Kg of US origin) was melted down but it has dissapeared anyway.

The attached will be a good base for a question where it has gone because my analysis of IAEA Report should bore its contradiction and can make another question possible to ask for quantitative analysis of 241Am which is decay material of weapon grade Plutinium of 239Pu.


However, I have another hesitancy how to use this analysis.


238Kg is worth 40 A-bombs and I don’t want to make people in panic again even five years have passed. And I have no intention to blame anyone for the initial cover up of Unit 4 bacause if I were either Mr. Obama or Mr. Kan, then PM of Japan, I was most likely to do the same. But at the same time I can’t stand for the way our cirrent administration has been doing to Fukshima victims.


If I can make a deal with some one, in return to keep this analysis confidential, who is powerful enough to persuade not only Japanese government but the US to take care of those vicims including potential ones of the US.


It is out of question to host Tokyo Olympic games and resume nuclear power plants by leaving aside the increasing number of kids of thyroid cancer and other sickness and radiation contamination of drinking water and food chain of marine animals which are serious problems.


I am thinking of Mrs. Agneta Rising, Director General of World Nuclear Association. which I think is the most powerful organization. It would be useless to negotiate with IAEA officials or government officials.

If they give up Japan market only, the deal might be possible which is probably my wishful thinking though but how they would see if this deal could protect the reputation of the US government.

Also, I have a proposal for them to start scientific reaserch to use microbes to clean up the nuclear waste and I thibk it is time to do something like this to mitigate nuclear overload on the earth.


This is all that I can say to you now.

If you have any idea to use this information for realistic and viable further activity, please let me know. I don’t mind that you share my analysis with people you can trust taking into concideration my thought I mentioned above.


Best regards,


Slide begins





The following table is a list made from IAEA Report on events, levels of radiation recorded and water level and temperature of Spent Fuel Pool(SFP) of Unit 4. 




the next slide is to show details stated in the Report to make sure the summary of the table. 


続きを読む >>
2016.09.02 Friday

What and How wrong the cover up strategy of Unit 4?








































世界各国を束ねる最強の組織ですものね。 怖いですしね。


2016.08.25 Thursday

日本人の魂、どこに置いてきた?:Where did you leave your Japanese spirit?






2016.05.10 「何が気に障ったのだろう?:やっぱり、福島4号機かな

















2014.07.20 Sunday 印象操作第3次テスト:フクシマ4号炉の謎






何かの秘密を共有してしまった。それも、大変な秘密をと。 勿論、女性のことなどではありません。 ず〜っと心に引っ掛かっています。 フクシマ4号炉に関することが。

「行動様式学」的には、あまり執着するとバイアスになるので注意しなければなりませんが、安倍さんのアメリカというよりオバマ政権に対する”傍若無人(ぼうじゃくぶじん)”ぶりに驚いていたからです。 人間として見れば、二人は合うはずがありません。安倍さんの中韓挑発は、勿論、相手にも非はあるにせよ異常です。 私は、オバマ政権が何らかの形で強くたしなめるようなことがあるに違いない。場合によっては、鳩山さんを外したような手を打ってくるかもしれないと半分期待(?)していましたが、結果としてみると何もありませんでした。






私にはバイアスがありました。 ”オバマさん、好い人、安部さん良くない人”という。 このバイアスを捨てるには、裏返しに見ることが必要です。”安倍さん、いい人、オバマさん悪い人”と。これは、結構難しいのです。心理的に。




私は、中国が騒いだのでこのような呼び方をしていますが、キャンペーンの元はこの記事です。この記事は、2014年1月27日で、共同からJapan Timesです。 これも、変だな〜と思いました。

これは、アメリカと日本の間の話で、日本が返すのを拒んだようなことがあったにしても、あくまで二国間内部のことです。 どうしてメディアが揉めたみたいなことを書くのでしょう? 半世紀後に返還されたと書くだけでしょう、普通は。 アメリカからのリークですね。揉めたことを書かせるための。 常識から考えてそうなります。


さらに、あんな大げさな決着の付け方も不自然です。 たかが、貸していたものを同盟国から返却させただけで、核不拡散の大きな成果って、いくら何でも大げさと思います。

それでは、何故、リークして物事を大きくしたのか? これが、問題。ものすごく大事な疑問です。 あっさり、推測。免罪符にしたかったのでしょう。アメリカは。


私は、そう思いますが、リークの証拠も掴んでいませんし、免罪符というのも私の勝手な憶測です。 この二段階の想像(これが、ある事象から生じる新しい仮説のセットです。そこから免罪符という演繹予測が生まれる例です。

これが正しいとして、次の憶測が生まれます。 つまり、4号炉で何が起ったにせよ、”アメリカが貸したプルトニウムは関係ない”という。

アメリカが貸したプルトニウムは東海村にあった。それがフクシマ4号炉に移されていたというのか?と質問されても私にはわかりません。(こんな正直者では”印象操作官”失格?) しかし、移されなかったという証拠はあるのでしょうかね? アメリカの刻印が押されたプルトニウムが東海村で保管されているのが証明されれば、ここで、私の印象操作三次テストはお終い。落第。


そうなんです。中国が300kgキャンペーンした時のIAEA天野理事の返答も政府の対応も、私には、”あの300kgは無くなったから返せない”と言っているように聞こえました。 しかし、返却で決着しました。


私は、”オバマさんの300kg返せリーク”は、印象操作としては失敗と思います。 そのお陰で、帰納的な予測の新しい仮説のセットが生まれることになったからです。



秘密保護法が怖かったので、口には出しませんでしたが、演繹的に4号炉で核兵器を開発していたのではないかと述べたのがこのブログでした。 そこでの仮説のセットは以下の通りでした。








ぁ,海海泙任蓮解釈、解釈、つまり仮説と云っていますが、流れ(ストーリー)として極く自然です。自然に流れるものは事実であることが多いのです。 この演繹的に生まれた疑問(核兵器を開発していたのではないか?)と、今回の帰納的推論(予測)がクロスするものかどうかを検証するのが、次の段階です。私は、これを検算と呼ぶこともあります。


5)帰納的推論の前提:これが怖い もし、”プルトニウムでありさえすれば、何でもいい”ということで、決着したのなら、ここから先が、「行動様式学序論」の著者として腕の見せどころになるのですが・・・ 怖さを捨て去りましょう、思い切りましょう。(自分を鼓舞しているんです。)


”何でもいい”で決着したという話で帰納的推論を進めます。 推論の前提を、”4号炉にあったアメリカが日本に貸した300kgのプルトニウムが完全にメルトスルーした”とします。




そうでしょう? 誰の責任でもない予期しなかった地震と津波の所為です。 いずれ、落下放射能どころでない量のプルトニウムが海洋に流れ出す。その結果何が起るか正確には誰もわかりません。 止める手立てもなければ、回収することもできません。 はっきりしているのは、アメリカばかりじゃなく、どこの国であっても大統領や首相の立場にいる者は窮地に立たされます。 正直にメルトスルーを認めたらどうなりますか?

自国民ばかりじゃない。全世界の人々が恐怖と不安に陥る。それを防ぐ手立てもありません。 しかも、それが、アメリカが日本に貸した核兵器に直ぐ使えるレベルのプルトニウムとしたら、アメリカの立場は一体どうなるでしょうか?




・・・・・なかったことにする以外の方法がありますか? あるなら、誰か教えていただけますか?









3)IOCで”under control”宣言:2013年9月(画像は、こう云った時の神々しいお姿です。ご確認をどうぞ)





原子放射線の影響に関する国連科学委員会(UNSCEAR)は、“一回目の(甲状腺の)小節、シスト、がん発生の増加が観察されたが、検査精度の向上から予期された程度であった。福島事故の影響のない地域における同様の検査データから見て、福島県の子供たちに見られる甲状腺がんの発現率は高いが、それは放射線被爆と無関係である。 野生生物と近辺のエコシステムの影響は、人間の健康に対して予見したものと同程度のものであった。















安倍さんは、偉いです。 この壮大な戦略の一端を引き受けました。そして、アメリカに対する貸しを作りました。 アメリカを屁とも思わない安倍さんの好き放題の理由がやっとわかったという次第です。 薄々感づいているいくつかの国の首脳に対しても大きな顔で自信満々になれるというのもこれがあるからでしょうね。 世界原子力協会とコネを持たない政治指導者はいない筈ですから、恩も売れるという訳。






う〜ん、大したもんだ。 ただ、安倍さんにとって、これまでは、これで良かったにしてもミューオン検査で180度不利になります。 ミューオンの検査結果は、恐らく、”炉心はすべてメルトダウン最終段階にあって、最悪の事態は過ぎた”という結論になるのでしょう。

1)〜6)の流れとしてはそうなる筈です。そうでなければ、全体のストーリーが崩れます。これは、今後の検証のポイントです。 それと同時に安倍さんのアメリカに対する貸しは帳消しになります。

ミューオンは1〜3号炉対象ですから、今後4号炉の問題が仮に出たとしてもすべては安倍さんの責任ということになります。 私に疑問を持たせたので失敗操作と云った”300kg返せリーク”は、日本から蒸し返す機会を奪ったアメリカの立派な戦略です。4号炉が何かの弾みで問題になった時点で安倍さんは、国際的に四面楚歌ということになります。みんな、”オレ、知〜らない”でしょうね。深刻な顔で悩んだ振りはしても、現実には何もできない。せいぜい、魚の汚染状況をチェックするぐらい。費用どうするのですかね?


そして、そうなれば、東京オリンピック自体が今度は重荷になります。 でも、何が何でもやらなければならない。



今回のブログは、「イノベーションのメンタル・モデル」からタイトルを「行動様式学序論」として発刊を紹介した6月26日から、Intermissionに用いるために企画していました。演繹的予測の”仮説のセット”の演習事例にするためです。 しかし、問題があまりに大きいので物証もないのに無責任過ぎるかもしれないと公開を躊躇していました。 躊躇は、300kgものプルトニウムが海洋汚染した場合、一体どうなるかについて皆目見当がつかないことです。何度も何度も躊躇して今日に到った訳ですが、私の推論が間違いであってくれればいいという気持ちはあります。 しかし、私の推論が違うなら、具体的に反論して貰うことの方が余程大事だと思うようになったのが公開の理由です。


さらに、海洋汚染ですが、降下物による汚染と若干異なることになるのかもしれないと祈るような期待もあって、逆に、多くの人が心配しなくてもいいような科学的な説明も求めたいという願いもあります。 プルトニウムの比重はおよそ20ですから、300kgのプルトニウムというのは、500mlのビール6缶ケース5個にしかなりません。降下物(fall out)ではないので、地下水からいずれ海洋に流れ出る可能性がありますが、重いですから海底に沈殿します。そこから徐々に海洋汚染が拡大すると思いますが、海表面の汚染シミュレーションとは若干異なる形になるのかなとは思います。しかし、詳しいことはわかりません。


世界の過去の研究報告をまとめたこんな研究報告はあります。 出所は、ここです。省略)




ジャーナリストの質が今、問題になっていますが、何でもかんでも取材したからジャーナリストということにはならないと思います。優れたジャーナリストは、今回のようなホームワーク分析をしてから狙いを定めた取材ばかりでなく、傍証をもっともっと積み重ねる筈です。 調査・分析ジャーナリスト(Investigative Journalist)になろうとする人たちが増えて、読者もそのような目で記事を読むのが当たり前になる。そんな状況が日本を変えることになると信じています。


フクシマで絶望してはならないと思います。 原発反対ブログを読むとこっちまで気が重くなります。 ”何をやっても駄目さ”と大衆をあきらめさせる印象操作じゃないのかとまで疑いたくなることもしばしばです。


人類は、核で滅亡しません。 生物は、そんな柔ではありません。時間は掛かっても、顔つきも変わるかもしれませんが、適応すると思います。 これが、実は、書こうか書くまいか躊躇に躊躇したところです。 しかし、何度、躊躇しても生物としての人類の強さに立ち戻ってしまい、それが公開の三つ目の理由です。 ただ、これは原発を許容するためでなく、日本が先頭に立って核のゴミを作るのは限界を超えたと思います。そんなところで世界一になってどうするの?やることは逆じゃないのかと思います。


もう、いいよ、安倍さん。次は川内でしたっけ? もう、止めよう。




このビデオは、150年後の人類を描いたもの。 金持ちになって宇宙に作った人工の自然で暮らしたい?そんなに。




私は、戦います。 安倍さん、一年半、楽しんだでしょう? 今度は一緒に戦おうよ、ね。






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2016.08.24 Wednesday



私は、フクシマ4号機の使用済み燃料プールに米国から50数年前に借りた兵器クラスのプルトニウムがあった。プールの水がなくなったので、メルトダウンしてプルトニウムが放出された。東京オリンピックは、汚染のひどさを隠すために決定されたと推測したブログを書きました。 2014年7月20日の「印象操作第3次テスト:フクシマ4号炉の謎」です。このブログのタイトルもURLもグーグル検索で探せなくされ、三大ブラウザもブロックされました。削除するから沖縄の暴力を止めてくれとメッセージを送りました




ドイツZDF フクシマのうそ2012年3月8日公開
ドイツZDF フクシマのうそ 投稿者 sievert311



これは、カナダのブロガー、ハトリック・ペンリー(Hatrick Penry)が、米国の秘密開示法によって調べたものです。彼も引き続き調査しています。今年1月に公開した彼の最新YouTubeをご覧ください。恐ろしくなると思います。下記の資料を収めたブログは現在もあります














ペンリーの調べたメールには、”President runs it”という文言が出てきます。
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2016.08.22 Monday






















If none of them have the willpower to break it, I will make them to have the willpower by making the situation at the same time that the US can’t instigate a fight.
During the last few days I brought up the issue of turn over of 331 Kg of weapon grade Plutonium from Japan to the US and there is only 93 Kg of US origin according to Savanah River Site Watch. This means the rest of 238 Kg has gone somewhere.

1) If Japan used them for A-bombs, you just ask Japan, the US and the world whether my country keeps them or not. If it does, it is the serious violation of nonproliferation which the rest of the world can't overlook. It will help stop even temporarily the quick build up of the tension.

2) I have a complete ground enough to suspect that 238 Kg was melted down in the spent fuel pool of Unit 4 of Fukushima to have released massive radiation both in the air and in the Pacific ocean. 
The weapon grade Plutonium has 92 to 93% of 239Pu which takes decay process to unstable 240Pu to turn to 241Pu of 14.4 years of half life and to 241Am which has 433 years of half life. There are no environmental data for contamination of 241Am even among a lot of studies available .
I would explain to any one how the cover up strategy was developed including scientific papers of environmental studies.

I have no intention to blame the cover up itself because there were no other ways for top leaders to avoid panic in March, 2011 but five and half years have already passed 
How can the world leaders ignore lingering contamination in air, soil and plants and food chain accumulation of sea animals? 
All the money for possible conflicts must be used to mitigate the radiation mess now. Think about that you only need six Kg for a bomb.

If there is any one who says what I am saying is a false rumor about the melt down, let’s ask GT to provide a special column for argument and I am prepared to be punished either by my country or by any body else if I were wrong.
















2016.07.03 Sunday

I feel uncomfortable with these research reports:プルトニウム環境汚染は無視していいのか?



1)However, the 241Pu activity in the marine sediments is currently very low (<5 mBq g−1) due to its short half-life (14.4 years), which makes it difficult to measure.

Thanks to our established sensitive analytical methods based on anion-exchange chromatography and sector field ICP-MS, 241Pu in the marine sediments can be accurately analyzed with sample amounts over 10 g.

The direct discharge of radioactive liquid waste should be the main way for possible Pu contamination from the FDNPP accident to the marine environment. However, very limited information is available regarding Pu concentration in the directly discharged radioactive liquid waste from the accident.
In our previous study,19 we investigated the Pu distribution in seawater samples (collected from May 2011 to January 2013) in the western North Pacific after the FDNPP accident and found that both the 239+240Pu activities and 240Pu/239Pu atom ratios were in the range of the background values before the accident.



さらに、もう一点は、以下の記述にあるparticle reactiveに関するものである。 

As the Pu isotopes are particle reactive and they can be easily incorporated by sinking particles, Pu distribution in the near coastal marine sediments can give direct information about Pu contamination in the marine environment. As no detectable Pu isotopes from the FDNPP accident could be identified in the marine sediments within the 30 km zone in this study, we concluded that the release of Pu isotopes from the FDNPP accident to the marine environment was negligible compared with the background levels. Global fallout and the PPG close-in fallout are the two main sources for Pu contamination in the marine environment before and after the FDNPP accident.
プルトニウムが土壌コロイドに吸着されやすい性質があると云っていると思うが、この抽出状態で吸着したプルトニウムが回収されたかどうか不明と私は思うが、この点は脇に置いても、排水された染排水の放射能濃度がわからず、移動・拡散情報も不十分で、アメリシウム(241 Am)の存在もわからず、沈殿層からの浮遊コロイドを魚類が摂取して食物連鎖の検討もまったくないまま、プルトニウムの環境に及ぼす影響はないという結論は、いくらなんでも無茶に過ぎると思われる。
最後に、Jiang ZHENGらの報告が、プルトニウム・アイソトープ種類のベースになっているが、あくまでも1号機と3号機のインベントリー・シミュレーションの結果である。4号機プール(使用済み燃料棒プール)からの汚染もあるとの前提に立っているかのような記述はあるが、使用済み燃料棒保管プールからの放出状況は不明としている。
追加:「Radiation levels in seabed off Fukushima ‘100s of times’ higher than prior to disaster – Greenpeace」(22 Jul, 2016)
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